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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ALBERT P. NEILSON and EILEEN

W. NEILSON,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.
7306

ISADORE EISEN,
Defend.amt and Appellarnt.

STATEMENT O·F FACTS

In presenting this case upon appeal, Ap.pellant has
completely abandoned every contention both of law and
fact that he presented to the trial court and consequently
hi'S statement of facts· does not fairly or accurately present to this court a complete factual picture. We therefore desire to supplement and correct the statement as
foUowR:

1
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Albert P. Neilson, Respondent herein, is a local contractor of long standing, engaged primarily in the construction of residences ( Tr. 94). During the year 1946,
upon real estate owned by him, he constructed and sold
nineteen ( 19) re'Sidences in the vicinity of Harrison Avenue and 18th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 94-95).
Some of these residences he sold through his own efforts
and some throught the efforts of realtors (Tr. 51). Upon
the latter sales he paid the full and regular commission
(Tr. 71) and used the selling faeili ties of several real
estate companies, including those of the Scott Investment C·ompany (Tr. 5~). It was this company that conducted the negotiations with the App~ellant about the
purchase of the residenee involved in this cas1e.
Appellant became interested in buying the property
during the ·early construction period and in June, 1946,
was negotiating with the Scott Investment Company
(Tr. 61-62). On June 7, 1946, Appellant made his first
offer for the prope.rty, evidenced by Exhibits 1 and A.
This proposal by Appellant was for $21,000.00, $1,000.00
being deposited on June 7, with the 'S·cott Investment
Company and the whole p~roposal being contingent on
two factors: (a) Sale of certain property owned by
Eisen and (h) Acceptance of the contract by Respondent.
It is undisputed that neither contingency occurredthe Eisen property was not sold and the proposal was
not accepted by Respondent. Consequently, Scott Investment Company returned Eisen''S deposit on July lOth.
(Exhibit B, Tr. 64). The significance of this preliminary
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transaction, "\Ve believe to be t\vo-fold: (a) Eisen's offeT
(Exhibit A) conten1plated a brick garage and (b) the
\\"ritten n1atters ""ere handled for Eisen h)T a member of
his fa1nily, Eisen being blind.
Appellant and the real ·estate company continued to.
negotiate and in August a similar but new p~roposal was
forth-coming. The price was raised from $21,000.00 to
$22,000.00. Eisen deposited $2,000.00 instead of $1,000.00
\Vith the real estate firm (Exhibits 3 and C). Ho,vever,
the same two contingencies continued-a purchas·e for
Eisen's West 8th South Street property had to be found
and the proposal had to be accepted by Respondent.
Again neither contingency occurred. Although Appellant, in the trial court, pleaded (Paragraph 3, Defendant's answer, Tr. 15) and contended that-it was under the
August lOth agreement that Eisen purchased the home,
his position was wholly untenable and we believe the
significance of the agreement to again be two-fold:
(a) A conflict in the testimony arose as to whether
the August proposal contemplated a brick or a frame
garage. Appellant claimed a brick garage. The witness,
Scott, testified a~ follows:

'' Q.
A.

Now, you are referring to the Eighth
SouthEighth South property, yes, and I think that
is embodied in that agreement. At that time
it was agreed that Mr. Eisen would not be
bound by the earnest money if he had to take
less than $8,500.00 for his property, and we
wouldn't he hound to hold the propert~· n1ore
than ~ixt~· rlay~.

3
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Albert I->. Neilson, Respondent herein, is a local contractor of long standing, engaged primarily in the construction of residences ( Tr. 94). During the year 1946,
upon real estate owned by him, he constructed and sold
nineteen (19) residences in the vicinity of Harrison Avenue and 18th East in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 94-95).
Some of the·se residences he sold through his own efforts
and some throught the efforts of realtors (Tr. 51). Upon
the latter sales he paid the full and regular commission
( Tr. 71) and used the selling facilities of several real
estate companies, including those of the Scott Investment C·ompany (Tr. 5~). It was this company that conducted the negotiations with the Appellant about the
purchase of the residence involved in this cas1e.
Appellant became interested in buying the propert~·
during the early construction period and in June, 1946,
was negotiating with the Scott Investment Company
(Tr. 61-62). On June 7, 1946, Appellant made his first
offer for the prope.rty, evidenced by Exhibits 1 and A.
This proposal by Appellant was for $21,000.00, $1,000.00
being deposited on June 7, with the 'Scott Investment
Company and the whole p~roposal being contingent on
two factors: (a) Sale of certain property owned by
Eisen and (b) Acceptance of the contract by Respondent.
It is undisputed that neither contingency occurredthe Eisen property was not sold and the proposal was
not accepted hy Respondent. Consequently, Scott Investlnent Company returned Eisen'·s deposit on July lOth.
(Exhibit B, Tr. 64). The significance of this preliminary
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trans·action, we believe to be two-fold: (a) Eisen's offer
(Exhibit A) contemplated a brick garage and (b) the
\\?ritten n1atters '""ere handled for Eisen by a member of
his fa1nily, Eisen being blind.
9

Appellant and the real ·estate company continued to
negotiate and in August a similar but new proposal was
forth-coming. The price was raised from $21,000.00 to
$22,000.00. Eisen deposited $2.,000.00 instead of $1,000.00
with the real estate firrn (Exhibits 3 and C). Hovvever,
the same two contingencies continued-a purchase for
Eisen's West 8th South Street property had to he found
and the proposal had to be accepted by Respondent.
Again neither contingency occurred. Although Appellant, in the trial court, pleaded (Paragraph 3, Defendant's answer, Tr. 15) and contended that it was under the
August lOth agreement that Eisen purchased the home,
his position vvas wholly untenable and we believe the
significance of the agreement to again be two-fold:
A conflict in the testimony arose as to whether
the August proposal contemplated a brick or a frame
garage. Appellant claimed a brick garage. The witness,
Scott, testified a~ follows :
(a)

'' Q.

A.

Now, you are referring to the Eighth
SouthEighth S·outh property, yes, and I think that
is embodied iil that agreement. At that tin1e
it was agreed that Mr. Eisen would not be
bound by the earnest money if he had to take
less than $8,500.00 for his property, and vve
wouldn't he hound to hold the propert~· rnore
than sixty day~.
3
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Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

Now, you wiU recall that attached to the
June ·earnest money receipt there was an
addenda calling for some specifications on
the Harrison Avenue prop~erty. Was there
any conversation relative to that~
Yes.
In the August meeting~
Yes. It "\Vas definitely understood that all
the specifications would he identical with the
exception of the garage, which had already
been started. During that interim of time
when the other agreement was cancelled out
and before the other one was consumated,
progre-ss had been continued on the Harrison
Avenue property, and the garage had already been started, and that was to be the
only exception on the completion of specifications.
Now, at the time of execution of this agreement dated August 10, was there attached
to it any specifications a.t all~
Not at the time it was signed up, because I
didn't have any specifications with me.
I show you what I have had marked Exhibit
C and ask you to identify that.
Yes. This was-this set of specifications was
part of three or four copies-! don't know
which they are-made up when I got back
to the office, a ·copy of which we kept, a copy
of which was forwarded to Mr. Eisen.
Approximately on what date~
Well, I believe it was the same day that I
brought the earnest money back to the office.
I just had the other specs. copied with th(?
exception of the garage and mailed it out.
And the substance as contained in Exhihit
C "ras the4
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--:\.

T·hat 'Yns thP hnsh~ of our (lisenssion. The
garage had alrpndy bPPn sta rtt>d. J)uring
that period of tilne in t hPrP the garagp, had
already been started, and it had to continue
on. l)rogre~~ on the houst\ had been delayed
under the tern1~ of the otla~r agreement anyhow·.q (Tr. 68-69).

The Respondent, Neilson, testified:

'' Q.

N o,v, after the concrete slab is laid, is it
praetical to put a brick garage up~
A. It would be very impractical. The city inspector vvouldn 't allow it.
Q. Did you have any dealings with the defendant
Isadore Eisen or any of his children prior
to Decen1ber 7, 1946, which is the date of the
contract in evidence which bears. your signature J?
A. Not to my knowledge, only just conversation
when he come out on the project." (Tr. 97).
(b) The written matters were again handled for
Appellant by a member of his family, whose authority
was unquestioned. (Exhibit C).
Although the first two proposals submitted by Eisen
had not been acceptable to Respondent, Eisen remained
interested in the home. Eisen, members of his family,
and ~rr. Bernstein, attorney for Eisen, contacted the
witness, Scott, from time to time ( Tr. 72). Construction
of the home continued and a fram·e garage was built.
This Appellant knew. (Tr. 169). Early in December,
1946, the witness, S;eott, received a telephone call from
Mr. Bernstein to the effe·ct that "they were ready to
elos·e that Eisen deal." ( Tr . 73).
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On December 7th, a meeting was held in Mr. Bernstein's office at whieh the agreements evidenced by exhibits 4 and 5 were

pr~pared

by Mr. Bernstein and ex-

ecuted for the Buyer by his daughter, Freda. A check
endorsed by the daughter upon Appiellant's account and
in his name for the sum of $5, 094.85 was delivered to the
witness Scott (Exhibit 7). Eisen was not present at the
meeting but authorized his daughter to meet and act in
his behalf (Tr. 122). He denies that he knew she had
sign·ed a contract for him but in view of the fact that
his attorney and two members of the family were present,
that he took possesion pursuant to the agreement, made
payments according to the terms of the contract (Exhibit A) and admits that he and he. alone was the purchaser of the property (''I was the only one who bought
that home, and I was the only one paid for it.") (Tr.
140), overwhelms a convenient denial on this point.
The Respondent accepted the De-cember 7th agreement, the hom·e was completed, and Eisen took possession
and is still in possession. Eisen paid $6,500.00 to N·eilson
on January 10, 1947, pursuant to the contract (Exhibit
8) but refused to make the final payment of $8,500.00.
This litigation ensued from his refusal.
Appellant concedes that he owes Respondent $8,500.00
pursuant ·to a contract of purchas-e but claimed the right
to deduct the sum of $2,392.08, largely fron1 alleged
damage due to Respondent's failure to erect a brick
garage. (Paragraph 5, Defendant's Answe-r, Tr. 16). He
has com·pletely abandoned this claim on appeal.
1

G
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\\~ e

have set forth to son1e length thP factual development8 of this controversy in the belief that the
record indicates so ru1npletely the 1nerit of the trial
court's decision that . A. ppellant O\Ycs the balance- of the
contract purchase price and should pay it and that this
appeal is merely an atte1npt to grasp at technical straws
and is \Yholly \\ithout 1uerit.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMEN·T

_A_s the record discloses and Appellant admits, there
is no question as to the liability of the App·e1lant to Respondent. In the court below, the issue was simply: How
n1uch? N o,v, on appeal and for the first time, Appellant
raises three technical questions, not one of which goes
to the substance of the controversy. We shall therefore,
first address ourselves to the question of whether Appellant can avail himself of a new theory on appeal and
then shall consider his technical objections in the orde-r
presented in Appellant's brief.
POIN'f 1
NON-PERFORMANCE ·OF A CONDITION PRECEDENT
CANNO'T BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.

Appellant's principal argument. on appeal appears
to be that the tender of a deed was a condition preeedent
to the bringing of this action. As we will later point out,
we do not believe this contention to have merit as applied
to the instant factual situation. However, regardless of
the 1nnrit of the contention, it cannot be first raised on
7
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appeal. The rule is well settled rthat, regardless of the
merit of the contention, non-pe-rformance of a condition
precedent cannot be raised for the first time on app~eai.
A multitude of authority annotated under Appeal and
Error, Key No. 173 ( 4) sup;ports the rule in all jurisdictions.
In the early California case of Cast·ro vs. Gill, 5 Cal.
40, it was held that in an action for the possession of

land held under a lea:se, an o hj·ection that a notice to quit
had not been served could not be raised for the first
time on appeal.
Current decisions are to the same effect. The court
of Errors. and Appeals in New Jersey would not consider
for the first time on appe-al the failur;e of an insurance
company to first tender or return an unearned portion
of a premium.
''The only other contention made by the Ap:pellant is that the defendant was not entitled to a
judgment because it failed to return, or tender a
return of the premium on the policy in question.
As to this it is sufficient to say that the point is
not now available to the Appellant to bring about
a reversal even if the point we-re meritorious. We
express no opinion whatever on whether it has
merit. The question was not raised in the court
below. Only an objection which was laid before
the trial cour,t will be considered by an appellate
court in review· of the trial court's judgment.
This was not raised.'' Prooacci vs. United Stat-es
Fire Insurance Comp,any, 193 A 180 (New Jers·ey).
8
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The contention that a condition· precedent had not
been perforined-in that contractual remedies had not been
exhausted before suit for damages 'vas brought, was not
allo,ved in Edelstein rs. JJuluJh "AI & I llnil~road ronlpa n y, 31
2d -!G~. The court said:

N''r

"The ~uggestion made for the first time on
the appeal that plaintjffs cannot maintain these
actions for failure to exaust contractual remedies
will not b~ considered, under· the well-settled rule
that points not raised in the lo,ver court and
raised for the first time on appeal will not h~
considered.''
Nor can w·aiverbe first raised on ap~peal.
"The final proposition urged by defendants
will not be considered by this court for .the reason
that the claimed defense was not properly urged
~betore the trial court.'' Wood vs. Jon,than Bixby
Conzpany,_ (California) 84 Pac. 2d 204._·
California'.is quite emphatic in upholding the prop~o
sition that non-p·erforrriance of a '(~,onditinn :precedent
cannot for the first. time be ·raised .on ap·p~aL ··.-In Los
Angeles Investment Comp_an~ vs. Home Savitngs ~;f!nk of
Los .Angelps,. 182 P~c. 293, the.tende,r pf som·e chec~~s wa~.
a condition precedent to the suit involving such checks.
The pleadings and record were silent on such tender ~nd
the matter was first raised on appeal. In c.onsidering this
matter, the court stated:
"It is clear that the point was not made at
the trial, that the cause was tried on other issues
entirely and as if this point were not present,
and that the necessity of proving either tender
or an excuse for it was not brought to ~~he plain9
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tiffs atte,ntio.n. Such a point, which the plaintiff
might,. a:qd ~n this. case in all probability could,
have niet hy sufficient evidence if obj.ection to
its recovery had been made on this ground at the
trial, cannot be rais·ed for the first time on appeal.''
POINT 2
UNDER THE FACTUAL SITUATION OF THE INSTANT
CASE A TENDER OF A DEED WAS NIOT A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO THE BRINGING OF THE ACTION.
Even in those jurisdictions holding that a final purchase money suit should be predicated upon a tender of
deed the rule is not applied whe~e th·e purchaser denies
the contract or otherwise indicates that a tender would
be futile.

:, 'A~'· ·a 'gerieral rule, if the purchaser has
renderetl a tender of the deed futile by his repudia. tion of: the contract or his express declaration that
he will not receive it this will ordinarily dispense
with its tender as a condition precedent to the
right of the ve.ndor to base a claim of non-p·erformanee by the purehaser. '' (55 American Jurisprudenee, Paragraph 325 Page 754.)
· The rule seems clearly ap;plicable to this case. On
·October 15, 1947 and long arter this controversy arose,
Mr. Bernstein, attorney for Appellant, and acting for
him wrot~ in part :
''I am authorized to advise you by the pur·ehaser that the balance of $8,500.00 will not be
paid until the following items are completed to
wit: Sink ,taps in small bathroom; chron1e around
dining-room windows; windows in garage doors;
coving for kitchen floor; screens for moveable
windows.'' (Ex. E).
10
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In view of these statements on the part of Eisen and
his prior conduct, it \Yas apparent to Respondent that it
was futile for hilu to atten1pt to get Eisen to perforn1.
The letter specificall~T indicates that the tender of a deed
would be useless, as Eisen was attempting to impose
condition after condition upon hin1. Neilson had already
done more 'vork.-upon the home .than_ 'v~s ~ailed for (Tr.
105), including the installation of a special gate or door
across the basement. stairs (Tr.168).
The futility of tendering a deed to Eisen became a
certainty as the issues were joined by the pleadings and
at the trial. Eisen specifically denied having purchased
under the contract upon which Respondent relied. No
clearer repudiation of the December contract could be
made, (Defendant's answer, Paragraph 3, Tr. 15) than
when Appellant claiJ?ed under another and different
contract.
Eisen would not have accepted a deed and won't
now. His contention in that regard, raised for the first
time on appeal, is totally wirthout merit in law or fact.
In addition to the fact that the tender of a deed is
not required when such a tender would be just a useless
gesture, there is -considerable and respectable authorit~r
to the effect that a tender is not a condition precedent
where the purchaser is in possession of the property.
The authorities to this effect are collected and annotated
in 35 A. L. R., 123.
The reason for the rule as announced is obvious:
The possessory interest of the purchaser adequately p·rotects hitn against any and all wrongful aets of the seller.
11
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Utah seems to Teeognize this rule.. In Burg.e ·vs. J efferson, 80 Utah 374,.15 Pacific 2d, 326, the court held that
under a judgment in ejectment, the vendors execution of
contract and tender thereof to purchaser was not a condition precedent to .requiring purchaser's payment of deferred installm·ents or to declaration of forfeiture.
3 ·
WHERE RELIEF IS GRANTED C0NSISTENT WITH
THE ISSUES AND THE~ORY UPON WHICH A CASE IS
TRIED, COMPLAINT CAN_NOT BE MADE F·OR THE
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT O'THER AND DIFFERENT RELIEF N!OT URGED UPON THE TRIAL OOURT
SH~OULD H·AVE BEEN GIVEN.
P~OINT

1

Appellant, for the first time, now urges that Respon.;.
dent should have been order·ed to convey subjeet to an
existing encumbrance. As we will subsequently point
·out (Respondent's Brief, Point 4), .Appellant's argument
is based entirely upon a mistaken and incorrect statement of ·.fact. However, ·even if his factual statements
were horne out. hy the record. Appellant· cannot rais·e
such an issue for the first time on appeal. It is. entirely
inconsistent with every contention he has previously
made.
As. we have attempted to emphasize, the issue below
was : How much did Eisen owe~ And the conflict \Yasupon
the question of whether or not Eis·en had agreedto huilrl
a brick ·garage. Counsel for Appellant admits this. ·
Question (by Mr. Metos) : '~Now, I '11. call your
_attention to Exhibit A and ask you to run
through that, specifications of the resideneP
· located at Harrison Avenue, and ask you if
12
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those "TtAre not the one~ ~·on furnished to
Scott InYestmen t Con1pan~·. ''
Ans\\Ter (by 1\lr. Neilson) : "These were never
"Tritten by n1e to n1y kn<)\vledge. I think T
agreed to everything on this-I'm not absolutely positiYe-bnt the garage.,,
"You agreed to eYerything that's on there~''
. .:\.. ''As far as-if I did see it, the garage seemed
to be the big i ten1. ''
Q. '• \\Tell, of course, that's the issue in this lawsuit. You agree to everything except what is
the issue in this la1vsuit. That's right, isn't
it~'' (Tr. 105).
And the prayer of Appellant's answer clearly indicates that his present claim is but an after-thought.

Q.

"WHEREFORE, defendants having fully
answered, pray that plaintiffs' complaint be dismissed; that they be ordered by the Court to deliver to defendant Isadore Eisen a Warranty
Deed of said premises upon the defendant Isadore
Eisen paying to plaintiffs the sum of $6,107.92,
and for such other and further relief as may be
just in the premises." (Tr. 16).
An appellate court should not now listen to a contrary, inconsistent theory.
''The Supreme Court does not look with favor upon a contention ·of a party made in the
Supreme Court for the first tin1e, particular}~·
where the rontention is inconsistent with the position of that litigant in the eourt below.'' M eMullin
vs. Magnuson, ( C~o}orado) 78 Pacifie 2d, 964.
An examination of the re-cord reveals that the exi~tenre of a construction 1nortgage on the property is
l:J
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but casually mentioned and that there js absolutely no
evidence showing the details of the mortgage, and especially, the present am'Ount due under it. Such a casual
matter cannot be made an issue on appeal.
"In a suit to quiet tit_le as against a lien of a
judgment, plaintiffs claim of homestead will not
be passed on where the pleadings and findings
are silent on the subj·ect of a homestead and it
app~ears only incidentally that there was a hom·estead elaim in the former action in which judgment was recovered.''

Hickey vs Algie, California 197, Pacific 359. See also
K ,ozitzsch vs. M iddlton (Calif.) 165 P2 729 at 736.
POIN'T 4
THE ARGUMENT ADVANCED BY APPELL.ANT IN HIS
P~OINT 2 IS BASED ENTIRELY UPON ~~ MIS-S'TAT'EMENT OF FACT.

Appellant eonsist.ently throughout his brief (Pages
14-18) makes the statement that Respondent has encumbered the property with a mortgage equal to the amount
of the unpaid purchase price, that is, the sum of $8500.00.
This is a pure and simpl.e mis-.stat1ement ~of the reoord.
The R.espondent, Neilson, testified that early in 1946
he placed a -construction mortgage upon the property
for $8,000.00 ( Tr. 111). There is absolutely nothing in
the record to indicate that an encumbrance equal to the
amount of the unpaid balance under the contract ever
existed.
The record because no issue concerning the mortgage
ever arose In a trial court, is very sketchy concerning
14
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the mortgage. The only mention appears in Neilson's
testi1nony~

sun1n1arized at Page 111 of the transcript.

The fact is, as

_.A.. ppellant

'veil kno,Ys, that the 1nortgage

has al,vays been and is nO\Y considerably less than the
amount owed by Eisen.
Consequently, Appellant's contention that Respondent must conYey subject to an encumbrance and -tha.t
no cash is involved in this litigation is entirely without
merit. Eisen is entitled to a warranty deed to the property upon payment of the moneys due. Concurrent with
such payment, unless Neilson chooses to make prior payment of the mortgage, the mortgage will be paid. Such
procedure is the usual one in real estate transactions.
Deed, release of encumbrances, and payment of purchase
money are all given and received in one transaction. No
other method is practical as purchase money must usually be used to pay off encumbrances.
POINT 5
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS N~OT APPLICABLE T'O
THE INSTANT FACTUAL SITUATION N'OR CAN THE
QUESTION BE FIRST RAISED ~ON APPEAL.

The "\Vriter is somewhat at a loss to determine what
Appellant claims under the argument advanced under
his Point 3. However, it seems clear that if he claims the
shelter ·of Statute of Frauds that his position is not
sound.
The contract in issue is wholly executed and completely performed except for the final paym·ent. Eisen
is in possession of the property and has been for two
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years. He has paid $13,500.00 u~on the pur_chase price.
He admits that he and he alone was the purchaser.
''I was the only one who bought that home,
and lwas the only one paid for it.'' (Tr. 140).
Under thes-e circumstances w·e_ ·can. see no possible
application of the Statute of Frauds.
The Statute of Frauds is a p·ersonal defense that
may· he waived. Consequently, being an affirmative deense, it cannot be first raised on_ appeal.
"In any event, to permit appellant at this late
date, 'Yhen the agreement in _question has been
performed in its entirety by respondent, to rely on
the defense of the statute of frauds would be
manifestly unfair to respondent and would allo\v
the appellant to he enriched unjustly at his expense. The principle here applicable was aptly
stated by this -court in the case of Flint v. Giguier-e, 50 Cal. A~pp. 314, 320; 195 P. 85, 88 :' * * *
in cases like this where one of the parties has performed his obligation, has suffe-red the detrim-ent
contemplated by the agreement, and the other
party has fully received the henefi t of the transaction. the -chancellor has a large dis-cretion in
determining whether it would be inequitable to
allow the party who gains by the contract t:o take
refuge under the statute of frauds, and, unless it
can be said that such discretion. has been abuserl,
an appellate court will not interfere'.''
"Appellant likewise urges that the agreen1ent
is invalid as contravening that section of the
statute of frauds which deals with contracts not
to he performed during the lifetime 'Of the pronlisor and contract:s to devise or bequeath propert~r.
Civ. Code, ser. 1624, Suhd. 6. J-Ier contention in

16
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this regard eYidently is predicated upon certain
testin1ony indicating that appellant had agreed
to n1ake a \Yill in respondent's favor and that
respondent had agreed tu 8ee that appellant received a decent burial. Hovvever, these asserted
provisions are not 1nentioned in the pleadings or
the findings and matters with reference thereto
are therefore outside the issues in the case, particularly as appellant does not ~omplain of the
action of the trial court in omitting to make a
finding \Yith respect thereto.'' To bola v. Wholey
(Calif.) 170 Pacific 2d, P. 956.
The substance of this rule is recognized by this
court in Chief Consolidated Mining C·ompany vs. Industrial C·oJnmission, 78 Utah 447, 4 Pacific 2d, 1083 and in
:ve Jon-es Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 Pacific 2d, 210.
SUMMARY

Under our Points 1, 3 and 3 we have cited some of
the num·erous authorities supporting ~ur contention that
none of the matters argued by Appellant in his brief can
be relied upon for the first time on appeal. The trial
court, sitting in equity, had before it the entire picture
of the development of this controversy. The issues were
eliminated and joined at the pre-trial. As the record
indicates these issues were narrovved dovvn to two principal questions:
(1)
and

Under what agreement was the house bought

sold~

(2)

Did the contract entitle Eisen to a briek gar-

age~
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Both these issues were decided -contrary to Appellant's contentions but upon clear and convincing proof.
Eisen's contention that it was the August agreement
clearly could not prevail as Neilson had never accepted
the proposal. Likewise Eisen's claim for damages regarding the garage had no merit and his testimony in
that regard was not worthy of ·belief. He had accepted
and entered into the possession of the house five months
after a frame garage was built. In January, after being
in possession over a month, he paid to Neilson, under
the exact requirement of .the D·ecember agreement, the
sum of $6,500.00. Under this set of facts we submit the
trial court -could not have reached any other conclusion.
It is also interesting to note that in even the preliininary negotiations that Appellant was represented continually by counsel who actually drew the documents
forming the basis of this lawsuit. Respondent was not
so· represented.
As we have indicated, the trial court was sitting in
equity. Having once invoked the equitable powers of
the ~court the ~parties could not now complain had the
court granted relief of a nature neither party had asked
for or anticipated. This however, did not occur. The
trial court, except ~as to a.mownt, grrarnted the exact relief
prayed for by Appellant.
In the prayer of the answer of defendant below, he
asked the -court to order Neilson ''to deliver to defendant Isadore Eisen a warranty deed of said premises upon
the defendant Isadore Eisen paying to plaintiff the RUlll
18
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of $6107.92. ~' ( Tr. 16). The judgn1ent of the c.ourt was
exartly as . .t\..ppellant prayed PXePpt as to a1nount. Neilson "·as ordered to deliver a 'Ynrranty <leerl to
upon rereiYing the full

pureha~e

Ei~Pn

prieP.

Ho'Y then can Appellant be heard to claim, upon
appeal, that other and different relief should have been
grantd J? He has abandoned his rlain1 regarding amount
and no"\v eon1plains that the trial court comn1i tted error
by doing the exact thing Appellant sought. As the
authorities indicate, an Appellate Court will turn a rleaf
ear to such an inconsistent position.
\"\;"'" e respectively urge the Court that Appellants
present ·position is untimely, inconsistent, and wholly untenable upon appeal.
And we further submit that even ha.Cl Appellant
given the trial court an opportunity to consider his
present contentions that they are without merit and
'vould not have changed the result. Eisen was and is in
possession of the property and in such cas·e does not need
a deed to protect him from a fraud. Consequently, a
tender of deed is not a condition precedent to this action.
Nor is such a tender· necessary when the purchaser indi. cates the futility of the gesture as in this case. The
authorities recognize the futility of tendering a deed to
a p·erson who says ''I "\vill not pay. I did not enter into
the contract you claim under."

As we have indicated, Appellants claim that the
1nortgage is equal in amount to thP sum rlue under the
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contract is not correct. Consequently, his position that
"vendors had only one duty to perform and that was
t.o deliver a de,ed subject to the mortgage" ( App. Brief,
P. 18) is not sound. Eisen·· owes several thousand dollars
over and above the mortgage. His contention that he
may have to pay the judgment and the mortgage debt
(App. Brief, P. 18) is not well taken. R·espondent, of
course, reeognizes that upon payment of the judgment
that he must convey free and clear of the mortgage. But
the two acts must of necessity he concurrent events:
Neilson must use the purchase money to pay the mortgage. Glassmam vs. Conaot'Yb, 27 Utah 463, 76 P. 343, cited
by App~ellant is clearly distinguishable. In the Glassman
case the very issue was whether the purchase price included the assumption of the mortgage or only part of
it. No such question is involved here.

We respectfully submit that the trial eourt reached
a just result, committed no error and that the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respeetfully submitted
CALLISTER, CALLISTER & LEWIS

Attorneys for Resp1ovndent
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